This paper establishes two facts about cross-border vertical integration and intra-firm trade of firms in Korean and Japanese manufacturing industries. First, the intra-firm trade between a parent firm and its affiliates is highly concentrated in a small number of large multinational corporations. Second, the input-output coefficient between the parent firm's industry and the affiliate's industry is weakly related to the presence and magnitude of intra-firm trade between the parent firm and its affiliates. Furthermore, these two characteristics are also found in domestic vertically integrated firms. In particular, the second point identifies a need for further research on the motivation of cross-border vertical integration between two manufacturers, the final good producers at home and the input suppliers abroad.
Introduction
The production-supply chain is a key factor to understanding the recent upward trend in foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asia driven by multinational firms. Multinational firms have invested in setting up their own local suppliers or affiliates in Asia in order to procure intermediate inputs, and this has resulted in the total amount of intra-firm trade simultaneously increasing over the recent years. As is commonly known, however, the industrial structure in Asia is dominated by large corporations. Thus, an increase in intrafirm trade will mostly likely be dominated by these as well. Furthermore, the local activities of foreign affiliates might have been diversified to sell specific intermediate goods to the local final goods producers. That is, intra-firm trade may differ depending on the characteristics of the firms and their affiliates. Thus, in this paper, we closely investigate firm-level data sets and the existence and patterns of firm heterogeneity in the intra-firm trade between parent firms and their foreign affiliates. This paper establishes two commonalities regarding the intra-firm trade of Korean and Japanese manufacturing firms: skewness toward a small number of large firms, and weak input-output (IO) linkage between parent and affiliate firms. Our finding of skewness in the intra-firm trade of large firms is consistent with the literature on exports and FDI. In this literature Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) uncover a positive relationship between firm exports and FDI and for U.S. firms, Tomiura (2005) and Tomiura, Ito, and Wakasugi (2011) uncover the positive association between firm productivity and offshoring decisions by Japanese firms, and Cho, Chun, and Hur (2014) examine the effects of firm characteristics on the offshoring decision of Korean firms. The commonality of these papers is their demonstration that larger or more productive firms are more likely to own foreign affiliates and to trade with them.
Our second finding of a weak IO link between intra-firm trade of the parent firm and its foreign affiliates is consistent with Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2016) , who showed that U.S. multinational firms do not have much direct trade with their foreign affiliates. Although we also reveal this same fact for multinational firms in Korea and Japan that own foreign affiliates in a vertical structure, our study goes further in testing whether the finding holds true for the firms' domestic vertical structure as well. This is particularly important for Korea and Japan because the domestic market structure of these countries is dominated by large companies that own a number of domestic affiliates in the manufacturing sector to a greater extent than is the case for the United States. Interestingly, we find that many vertically integrated firms have no transactions even with their domestic affiliates. Atalay, Hortaçsu, and Syverson (2014) provide an explanation for the weak intra-firm trade in domestic markets, with empirical evidence that "an acquired affiliate begins to resemble the acquiring firm" in terms of shipping location and product type. This explanation may not hold true for Korea and Japan, however, because of the very typical hierarchical structure of their domestic markets. Within a hierarchical structure, we cannot simply ignore the contractual relationship between large conglomerates and their small subcontractors because these subcontractors are highly dependent on the purchasing power of the large firms. Affiliates of a parent firm in a vertical structure produce intermediate inputs and supply them to the parent firm, and in turn the parent firm produces final goods and supplies them to consumers. Hence, the resemblance in terms of shipping location and product type may not be found from their activities.
1 These firms in Korea and Japan play their distinctive roles in the vertical structure of domestic markets, unlike in the United States.
Furthermore, the so-called transferring capability from parent firms to their affiliates cannot explain the lack of intra-firm trade in international markets as far as our data set is concerned. One possible route of transfer capability in the international context is technology transfer between parent firms and their foreign affiliates. For instance, parent companies may deploy their professional managers and technicians to their foreign affiliate plants or export their R&D outcomes such as patents and copyrights to their foreign affiliates. However, the parent-affiliate matched data set in our study is only between manufacturers within a vertical production process, not between headquarter service providers and input suppliers. 2 In this way, we controlled for the possibility of transferring technology or R&D outcomes from domestic headquarters to foreign input suppliers.
Thus, our findings for Korea and Japan raise quite challenging questions for the future. For example, if there is no intra-firm trade, what is the motivation for manufacturing firms to own affiliates? What is the relationship between integrated firms and the local final-good producers in foreign markets? Has the entire domestic supply network been relocated from domestic to foreign markets? We believe that this paper provides important basic facts about intra-firm trade in Asia and thus would induce further studies on these issues.
1 We cannot perform any empirical studies to verity this argument for Korea and Japan because the data of shipping locations and product types are not available.
2 For example, LG electronics in Korea produces TV sets in Korea and the affiliates in China supply TV displays to the parent company. The TV display is a necessary input for the TV set. One can expect that the TV displays produced in China would be imported back to the parent firm who produces the final good, the TV set. Our study, however, shows that the intensities of intra-firm trade between them are small. This is different from the case of Apple. Apple provides only headquarter services such as R&D, professional managers, product design, marketing skills, and so on, but does not produce their flagship product (iPhone) in the United States at all.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the data source and the main variables we use in this analysis. Section 3 elaborates on our results by presenting summary statistics and regression analyses. Section 4 summarizes the implications of our findings.
Data
We use two sets of firm-level databases for 2010, the first one for Korea, the Survey of Business Activities (SBA), published by Statistics Korea of the Korean government, and the second for Japan, the Basic Survey on Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA), collected by the Ministry on Economy, Trade and Industry of the Japanese government. Both databases cover all firms having more than 50 employees and more than 300 million Korean won (30 million Japanese yen) of equity capital in the manufacturing, mining, and commerce sectors.
For our research on the intra-firm flow of goods, we focus on the manufacturing sector. Our key variable is the intra-firm trade (export and import) between parent firms and their affiliates. Our databases on Korean and Japanese firms contain the affiliate firms' information such as country location, industry, and share of equity capital, as well as actual share. 3 Moreover, they provide detailed information on the firms' sales and purchase activities. In particular, intra-firm transactions are broken down to indicate whether they are domestic or foreign. The data sets do not report transactions by affiliate or destination, however. Therefore, we consider intra-firm trade as the total transactions between a parent firm and all its foreign affiliates. Furthermore, because we want to analyze firmlevel decisions about intra-firm trade, firms that were owned by another parent firm were excluded from our data sample.
We define a firm's vertical integration (VI) and its affiliates as follows. We first define a parent firm as a firm that owns at least 50 percent of the equity capital of its affiliates, because the majority-owned affiliates account for most of the intra-firm trade. Next, to define the vertical relationship (producer-to-supplier) between a parent firm and its affiliates, we consider a supplying industry as one that supplies the intermediate input of the producing industry based on a two-digit IO table. Thus, we can identify two types of VI between a parent firm and its affiliate. First, we define backward VI as when a parent firm belonging to a producing industry owns an affiliate in an industry supplying at least 5 percent of the total intermediate input of the producing industry. Forward VI is defined as when an affiliate belonging to a producing industry is owned by a parent firm belonging to an industry supplying at least 5 percent of the total intermediate input of the producing industry.
Regarding these definitions, we note one difference between the Korean and Japanese firm survey data sets. For the Korean SBA, we can identify the supplying industries that are matched to each affiliate that a parent firm may have. For the Japanese BSJBSA, however, because a parent firm reports only the names of the supplying industries in which it has affiliates, we do not have a one-to-one matching of an affiliate with its industries. To resolve this problem in the Japanese data set, as the representing supplying industry of the parent firm, we choose the supplying industry that provides the largest share of the intermediate inputs to the producing industry among the supplying industries to which the affiliates of the parent firm belong. There are two caveats with this method. First, one may observe a low level of intra-firm trade of vertically integrated firms in Japan case. That is, the method leads to a lower bound estimate of the intra-firm trade. This is inevitable, however, given the current limitation of Japanese firm-level data. Second, because we apply different definitions of the intra-firm trade variables in recording for the Japanese and Korean data set, we cannot directly compare the two results quantitatively.
In particular, we need caution in interpreting the results from Japanese firm-level data.
Facts and empirical results
We now present our main findings for Korean and Japanese firms in the following order. First, we provide summary statistics on intra-firm trade and discuss the fact that a significant share of integrated firms do not have intra-firm trade flows. We also show that the majority of intra-firm trade is concentrated in a small number of large firms. Second, through simple linear regressions, we document the absence of a positive correlation between the IO coefficients of the producing-supplying industry pairs and the actual intrafirm trade flows of the parent firm-affiliate pairs. Thus, we compare the similarities and differences of the Korean and Japanese firms. Table 1 presents the summary statistics regarding the integration decision of firms and their internal flow of goods. The total number of vertically integrated relationships involving a Korean parent firm and its affiliate in foreign countries in 2010 is 1,078. Out of these, only 440 firms (41 percent) exported to their foreign affiliates and 311 firms (29 percent) imported from their foreign affiliates. The remaining numbers of firms do not trade at all with their vertically linked foreign affiliates. Basically, the data set used in our study is a parent-affiliate matched data set between two "manufacturers". In our study, the parent company is not defined as a headquarter service provider. If so, the parent company should have been in R&D or any other business service sectors, not in in manufacturing sectors. This is quite different from the case of Apple, Inc. Apple is not a manufacturer in the United States. Our data set includes only manufacturing parent firms whose "main" industry are in the manufacturing sector. The parent firms are matched with their input producers in foreign countries under a vertical manufacturing process of final goods and intermediate inputs. The foreign affiliates are also within manufacturing sectors and their "main" activity is a production of intermediate inputs. Our data set does not include any foreign affiliates whose main activity is as an intermediary for transferring necessary inputs from a foreign country to the home country. The vertical relationship between the parent and the affiliates is defined by the IO table within manufacturing sectors only. In this sense, the lack of intra-firm trade between them seems surprising.
Overall facts
The top firms with the largest amount of exports and imports account for the majority of the exports and imports between the parent firms and their foreign affiliates. Moreover, employment is concentrated in the intra-firm trade of the top firms. For example, the top 50 firms account for approximately 95 percent of the total intra-firm trade, and their employment share of the total is approximately 52 percent. Thus, our findings based on Korean firm-level data can be summarized as follows: (i) a large proportion of vertically integrated firms do not trade with their foreign affiliates, and (ii) intra-firm trade is concentrated in a small number of large firms.
Interestingly, a similar pattern can be observed in the domestic market as well. When we investigate the domestic market only, we find 804 VI pairs, of which only 303 firms (38 percent) sell to their domestic affiliates and 291 firms (36 percent) purchase from them. That is, more than 60 percent of the domestic VI pairs are not engaged in goods transactions. As with the cross-border VI pairs, intra-firm transactions are also highly concentrated in a small number of firms. For example, the top 50 firms account for 95 percent of the total intra-firm domestic transactions of goods and their employment share is 57 percent. Now, we turn to Japanese manufacturing firms. The results for Japanese firms in Table 2 are similar to those in Table 1 for Korean manufacturing firms, but there are some major differences with regard to international business operations. First, the data from the Japanese firm sample show a larger number of domestic VI pairs compared with crossborder VI pairs-whereas the cross-border data show 1,420 VI firms, the domestic data show 1,626 firms. The Japanese firm sample shows a larger degree of VI in the domestic market relative to abroad compared with the Korean firm sample. Second, a larger number of VI firms in Japan trade with their foreign affiliates than with their domestic affiliates. More specifically, of the 1,420 cross-border vertically integrated firms, 876 firms export to and 789 firms import from their foreign affiliates. Moreover, we observe 1,626 domestic VI pairs, of which 464 (29 percent) VI firms engage in selling transactions and 413 (25 percent) VI firms engage in buying transactions with their affiliates. These proportions are smaller than those for cross-border VI firms. Compared with Korean firms, a larger share of Japanese VI firms are active in intra-firm trade in the global market. For example, 62 percent of Japanese VI firms exported to their foreign affiliates, compared with 40 percent of Korean VI firms. In particular, Korean VI firms are much less active in importing from their foreign affiliates. In particular, whereas only 29 percent of Korean VI firms imported from their foreign affiliates, 56 percent of Japanese VI firms imported from their foreign affiliates. This indicates that the probability of positive transactions is higher for Japanese VI firms than it is for Korean VI firms, although the ratio of cross-border VI firms to the total number of firms for Japan is lower than it is for Korea.
We note one more significant difference between Korean and Japanese firms. Whereas the top-ranked firms in Korea accounting for the large share of intra-firm trade also explain a large share of employment in the manufacturing industries, this is not the case in Japan. The top-ranked firms in Japan with a large share of intra-firm trade do not necessarily account for a large share of employment. For example, the top 100 cross-border VI firms in Japan account for only 35 percent of employment, while the top 100 firms in Korea account for 58 percent of the total employment in manufacturing industries. The lower degree of skewness toward large corporations in Japan is due to the economic restructuring policies of Japan during the 1990s. In contrast, because the Korean economy depends heavily on the role of large firms, intra-firm trade in Korea is dominated by large firms.
Regression results
Firm size As shown in the discussion of firm operations, intra-firm trade tends to concentrate in a small number of large firms. In this section, we formally analyze the regression models that highlight firm size as a key factor determining the intra-firm trade between a parent firm and its affiliates after controlling for the affiliates' industry and country fixed effects. We estimate the following two regression models:
ln (
The dependent variable in equation (1), D (X i j ), is equal to 1 if the amount of intra-firm trade, X i j , is positive, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in equation (2), ln (X i j ), is the natural logarithm of the amount of intra-firm trade flows. The second model considers the firms with a positive value for the intra-firm trade variable. For ij = ap, the direction of transaction is from the affiliates (a) to a parent firm (p); we call this intra-firm imports or purchases under backward VI. For ij = pa, the direction of transaction is from a parent firm (p) to the affiliates (a); we refer to this as intra-firm exports or sales under forward VI.
Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2016) focus on the size of affiliates; our key regressors are parent firms' employment, ln (E MP p ), and number of affiliates, ln (NAF p ). Our choice of regressors is motivated by the following factors. First, our Korean and Japanese firmlevel data sets do not report the affiliates' employment levels. Second, the parent firms' characteristics can be a proxy for the affiliates' characteristics. In contrast with the U.S. economy, large companies play a larger role in the Korean and Japanese economies. Hence the affiliates' performance and activities are highly correlated with the parent firms. Finally, γ ai is the control dummy for industry (i) of the affiliates (a) and δ ac is the control dummy for destination-country (c) of the affiliates (a). For Korea, we consider 23 industry dummies for both foreign and domestic affiliates, 67 country dummies for foreign affiliates, and 16 province dummies for domestic affiliates. For Japan also, we consider 23 industry dummies for both foreign and domestic affiliates. Because we have limited location information on the Japanese firms' affiliates, however, we consider only four regional dummies (China, North America, Europe, and Others) for foreign affiliates, with no location information for the domestic affiliates.
The upper panel of Table 3 reports the parent firms' size effect on the Korean firms' intrafirm trade with their foreign affiliates. Column (1) uses as dependent variable a dummy for the positive values of the parent firm's intra-firm import variable from its affiliate, and column (2) considers the value of intra-firm imports. The main findings are as follows. As the parent firms' employment level and number of affiliates increase, their intrafirm imports become larger as well. We obtain these results after controlling for the unobserved characteristics of the country the affiliates are located in and the industry they belong to.
Regarding forward VI, the intra-firm exports from parent firms to their affiliates, we also examine whether the size of the parent firm matters. Column (3) considers the dummy for the positive value of intra-firm exports as the dependent variable, and in column (4), which considers the amount of exports, these variables are significantly related to the employment level and number of affiliates of the parent firms.
Thus, as the summary statistics show, the size of the parent firms matters for the scale of its intra-firm trade with its foreign affiliates when the parent and affiliate are vertically related. When we focus on the parent firms' domestic affiliates, the results remain qualitatively similar to the case of cross-border VI. The lower panel of Table 3 shows the results for the Korean domestic firm VI sample. Now, we turn to the case of Japan ( Table 4 ). Note that there are slight differences in the setting of the VI variables. For Korea's SBA, we could identify the supplying industries of a parent firm that are matched to each affiliate. However, for Japan's BSJBSA, because a parent firm reported only the supplying industries in which it has affiliates, we could not find a one-to-one matching between an affiliate and its industries. The upper panel in Table 4 summarizes the regression results for the parent firms' foreign affiliates and the lower panel provides the results for their domestic affiliates. The results are similar to those for Korea. The employment variable in the upper panel of Table 4 does not have a statistically significant effect on the dummy variable for the parent firms' imports and exports with their foreign affiliates, however. For the domestic affiliates in the lower panel of Table 4 , we find that the number of domestic affiliates have no impact on the dummy for intra-firm transactions (both purchases and sales).
Overall, we might argue that firm size matters for intra-firm trade in Korea and Japan. From these findings as well as the summary statistics in the previous subsection, a large number of small parent firms have no transactions with either their domestic or foreign affiliates. Because the parent firm-affiliate pairs are defined by the producer-supplier relationship, we next test whether the IO coefficients of industries that the parent firms and affiliates belong to are related to the corresponding intra-firm trade.
IO coefficients
In this subsection, we compare the intra-firm trade of vertically integrated firms and their corresponding industrial IO coefficients. Formally, we estimate the following regression models:
Backward VI:
Forward VI:
Here, drxz is the coefficient of direct requirement of the parent firm's producing industry (z) from the affiliate's supplying industry (x). That is, it is the producing industry's share of purchases from its supplying industry when the parent firm belongs to the producing industry and its primary affiliate belongs to the supplying industry. Furthermore, drzx is the coefficient of direct sales of the parent firm's supplying industry (x) to the affiliate's producing industry (z). That is, it is the supplying industry's share of sales to its producing industry when the parent firm belongs to the supplying industry and its affiliate belongs to the producing industry.
With regard to Korea, the upper panel of Table 5 summarizes the regression results for the foreign affiliates showing that the industry IO coefficients are not related to the corresponding intra-firm trade flows. Columns (1) and (3) of the table show that the IO coefficients do not have any statistically significant relationship with the dummy variables for intra-firm import and export. Furthermore, these results appear quite robust to the variables for the intensive margin of intra-firm trade in columns (2) and (4) as well. The lower panel of Table 5 provides the results for domestic affiliates. These results are similar to those in the upper panel of Table 5 , except for the dummy variable for intra-firm sales in column (3). That is, the sales of a parent firm to its domestic affiliates seem to be unrelated to its corresponding IO coefficients of their industries of operation.
As Table 6 shows, we obtain similar results for Japan. The table summarizes the findings for the Japanese firms' foreign and domestic affiliates. Overall, we observe insignificant effects of IO coefficients on the intra-firm trade of vertically integrated firms. We observe two exceptions, however: the forward VI in column (3) of the upper panel of Table 6 , and that in column (4) of the lower panel of Table 6 . These show a rather weak positive relationship between the IO coefficients and intra-firm exports (or sales) from the parents to their affiliates. Nonetheless, we have very weak ground to argue for strong positive correlations between the industrial IO structure and intra-firm transactions in Japan. 
Full sample results
So far, our data sets have included only vertically integrated firms. Using these data sets, we could find that a significant share of vertically integrated firms do not trade with their affiliates at all. Our findings for Korea and Japan are quite robust. Our survey database also includes horizontally integrated firms, however. That is, there may be many cases where a parent firm owns an affiliate that is not vertically related to it through either supply or production. Therefore, we included all firms that are horizontally integrated affiliates in our sample and repeated all the data analyses and regression estimations. The main results remain qualitatively intact even with such a full sample data set for both Korea and Japan. All our results are readily available upon request.
Concluding remarks
We found two important facts related to intra-firm trade between parent firms and their foreign affiliates by using two data sets for Korean and Japanese firms. First, firms having high levels of employment and owning a large number of affiliates accounted for most of the intra-firm trade flows between parent firms and their foreign affiliates. Second, the IO structure of the parent firms' and affiliates' industries cannot explain the presence and magnitude of intra-firm trade between vertically integrated parent firms and their affiliates. These findings are robust to domestic VI firms as well as to a full sample including horizontally integrated firms.
Our findings, however, do not disprove the traditional belief that intra-firm trade can be observed in the cross-border production sharing system and that the export platform model is a dominant form of FDI. Thus, once a production "network" system is developed in a region, firms can certainly manage the sophisticated combination of not only intra-firm trade but also arm's length transactions. Athukorala (2011) investigated global production networks that emphasized trade flows and found a strong network influence on the intensity of goods flows. Ando and Kimura (2015) further found that the expansion of multinational firms stimulates the activities of headquarters as they organize global production networks and trade. Nonetheless, our second finding of lack of intrafirm trade between two manufacturers-a final good producer and its input-producing subsidiary-is quite robust in the Korea and Japan firm-level data sets. Hence, our findings open up a challenging question on the motivation for the lack of intra-firm trade of firms with their foreign affiliates. One may consider some forms of transactions other than the flow of "goods," for example, knowledge transfer through relocation of professional workers and technicians, and so forth. We leave these topics for future studies.
